How naturalists assume Christian beliefs are formed |
Apart
from the occasional optical illusion or magician’s trick, most would agree that
our senses do not typically deceive us. If we couldn’t trust our own senses,
our existence would be fraught with uncertainty and we would be unable to make
even the most basic decisions. For how could we know if what we were acting on
was true, false, or somewhere in between?
Similarly, there are those who contend that the early disciples of Jesus
made not a small decision, but the weightiest decision of their lives based on
misperception – they hallucinated Jesus’ resurrection and subsequent
appearances. While this idea that the disciples hallucinated the resurrection
of Jesus has enjoyed a resurgence of late, we shall see that the evidence
contradicts this position and is better explained by the early followers of
Christ having actually seen the physically resurrected Lord.
Let us first examine a hallucination
hypothesis proposed by Gerd Lüdemann, a New Testament scholar at the University
of Göttingen. Lüdemann proposes that all the resurrection appearances have
their origin in the Apostle Peter’s first hallucination of Christ. Peter,
wracked with guilt at his denial of Christ and distressed by the crucifixion,
hallucinated that which he most wanted to see – Jesus resurrected. This first
vision served as the catalyst, “which prompted the further series of visions
mentioned by Paul in 1 Cor. 15. The subsequent appearance of Christ can be explained
as mass psychoses (or mass hysteria).”[1] In
effect, Peter’s retelling of his experience prompted the other disciples to
undergo similar experiences due to a cultural acceptance of the miraculous and
supernatural. So strong was this suggestion and mass hysteria that it affected
James, the brother of Jesus who had opposed Jesus’ early ministry,[2]
and Saul, the persecutor of the early church[3], leading
to their conversions.
Lüdemann
supports his position for mass hallucinations with two main lines of argument.
The first is based upon the textual reports of the resurrected Christ in the
New Testament, specifically 1 Cor. 15:3-8. His contention is that Paul uses a
single term, opthe, to represent
various types of appearances – individual and mass appearances alike – and the
chain in which they occurred. This means that, “for Cephas the experience
denoted by opthe is not combined with
a previous process…but is first of all an immediate event, a primary
experience…the later [appearances are] based on the proclamation of Jesus as
the risen Christ by the earlier ones.”[4] So
for Lüdemann the previous experiences have to inform the latter because of the
sequencing in 1 Cor. 15. Lüdemann then cites Gustav le Bon, a specialist in
group psychology, to confirm his mass hallucination hypothesis. Le Bon
concludes that those of similar emotional makeup can experience a “communal
soul,” in which, “everything that stimulates the imagination of the
masses…appear[s] in the form of a moving, clear image which needs no interpretation.”[5]
This fits with Lüdemann’s theory that all of Christ’s followers were so
distraught by the crucifixion that on hearing of Peter’s vision they
experienced this type of “communal soul” and all saw a vision of Jesus
resurrected.
However,
there are several flaws with Lüdemann’s hypothesis. Foremost is that much of
his theory depends on analyzing the moods and thought patterns of Peter, Paul,
James, and the remainder of the disciples. Michael R. Licona adroitly states,
“Psychoanalyzing persons who are not only absent but also lived in an ancient
foreign culture involves a great deal of speculation and is a very difficult
and chancy practice.”[6]
The New Testament accounts do not provide enough support for the type of
conjecture that Lüdemann must indulge in to support his view. This is evident
in his treatment of Paul’s state of mind prior to his conversion. Lüdemann
speculates that, “The preaching of Christians had a very strong effect on him
[Paul]…his religious zeal was a kind of measure of his [conflict], which was
formally released in a vision of Christ.”[7] He
cites Paul exposition of law and sin in Romans 7 as evidence of this conflict.
The passage is too “loaded with experience” to be separate from Paul’s
conversion on the road to Damascus and must be viewed as a genuine state of
conflict in Paul’s mind.[8]
However, a close reading of Acts 9 and Romans 7 does not provide enough
evidence to assume an autobiographical nature to the passages as Lüdemann
theorizes.
It
must also be stressed that in proposing mass hysteria among the disciples based
on Peter’s initial vision, Lüdemann contradicts much of what we know about the
nature of hallucinations. Hallucinations are described by psychologists as
“private, individual events”[9]
that are not capable of being shared.[10]
While Lüdemann tries to bypass this issue by citing Le Bon’s work as support
for “communal soul” hallucinations, the point of Le Bon’s work was not to
explore mass hallucinations but the irrational behavior of groups due to the
anonymity of the crowd.[11] It
is in this context that Le Bon created the idea of the “communal soul”
Attempts
have been made to maintain the validity of Lüdemann’s “mass hysteria” among the
500 witnesses of 1 Cor. 15. Among these is a proposal by author Nicholas
Covington. He asserts, “No one says that the group has to see precisely the
same thing…it is completely possible…that some saw Jesus in white linen with a
pure, unblemished body, and that others saw him in black with pierced hands and
a wound in his side, and others saw Jesus in yet another form.”[12]
Additionally, blogger and author N.T. Wrong argues that the report of the 500
witnesses was a purposeful exaggeration created to give credence to the vision
of an individual or small group of individuals. He cites several historical
examples – Ashurbanipal’s vision of Isis, Constantine’s vision of the cross,
and Alexander’s dream at the siege of Tyre – in which a single person reported
a vision that was then attributed as having happened to a whole group.[13]
Both
arguments by Covington and N.T. Wrong fall into the same problems shared by
Lüdemann’s hypothesis – an appeal to conjecture with no solid evidence to
substantiate the claim. Covington’s argument appeals to psychoanalysis of the
long dead by attempting to explain the deeply seated emotions and attitudes of
the disciples. While the Gospel narratives give a thorough account of the resurrection,
they do not provide enough emotional insight into the disciples to make this
type of analysis. Most modern psychologists spend months or years in personal
interviews with their subjects to create the sort of profile that Covington
does with much more limited resource. Additionally, there is little scientific
evidence for Covington’s hypothesis of everyone hallucinating Christ in a
different manner as there is for Lüdemann’s hypothesis of a “communal soul” In
the same vein, N.T. Wrong mistakenly infers that the report of 500 witnesses
was fabricated to support an individual report of a resurrection vision, simply
because similar incidents are known to history. Just because there is a
correlation between semi-legendary reports of one vision being reported as
multiple visions the best explanation must be that the same thing occurs in the
Gospel accounts. He provides no strong evidence to support his hypothesis and
must rely on conjecture to sustain his idea.
Additionally,
both arguments ignore that the claim made by Paul in 1 Cor. 15:3-8, regarding
the witness of the resurrected Christ, was given as a historical record
intended to be verified independently if necessary. In the case of Covington’s
argument, if 500 separate witnesses had hallucinated Jesus in different modes
or appearance, any outside verification of the event would immediately detect the
discrepancies in the accounts and disprove the whole. The same holds true for N.T.
Wrong’s hypothesis that reports were purposefully exaggerated to include a
large group. Any outside verification would reveal that no such group had seen
Jesus and such a claim had no basis in reality.
Apparently we shouldn't drink the water in Israel. |
A second critic that has received
attention with his hallucination theory is Michael Goulder, professor of
Biblical Studies at the University of Birmingham until his death. Goulder’s
position differs from Lüdemann’s in two distinct ways: first, he allows for
only a few hallucinations rather than mass hallucinations, and second, he
argues that the retelling of the supposed resurrection appearances over time
filled in the necessary gaps in accounts of the resurrection appearances.
Goulder
strengthens the hallucination theory by removing the need for mass
hallucinations, and instead limits the source of the resurrection appearances
to a few individual hallucinations. He states, “It would be difficult to think
that all five hundred of the witnesses to the risen Jesus…were in this state
(conversion-vision), but fortunately we do not have to think that. Only Peter
and Paul were in the position of having primary conversion visions…”[14]
This state of “conversion vision” is one in which the whole of persons psyche
is rocked by emotional disturbances and shifts in self-image leading to a
radical change in outlook and behavior.[15]
Goulder
singles out Peter for this condition because in his estimation Peter was the
disciple most emotionally shaken by the events of the crucifixion. Peter would
have been distraught by his self-preservation in spite of his protests to Jesus
of being ready to die, his denial of Jesus, and the loss of hope in seeing the
kingdom of God ushered in.[16]
Additionally, Peter is a likely candidate because of other reports of his
visionary experiences, namely on the Mount of Transfiguration and on the
rooftop just prior to the conversion of Cornelius. Paul is the other likely
originator of the vision report because of a supposed inner conflict sparked by
the teachings of the early church, his desire to uphold traditional Judaism,
and Paul’s own struggle with the concepts of law and grace. Goulder suggests
that Paul’s blindness in Acts 9 was “psychogenetic blindness” caused by
resistance to his own inner conflict. He cites Carl Jung’s analysis of Paul to
support the feasibility of Paul’s distress, “Unable to conceive of himself as a
Christian, on account of his resistance to Christ, he became blind, and could
only regain his sight through complete submission to Christianity.”[17]
Goulder
also argues that as stories of the resurrection appearances were told and
retold, reports of visions multiplied and details in the stories were filled in
along the way. Goulder draws a parallel between the retelling of the
resurrection visions of Paul and Peter to the sightings of UFOs and Bigfoot in
small communities. “[F]rom time to time someone sees an unidentified flying
object, and then dozens of people will report seeing a UFO…These delusions
spread most easily in uneducated communities, especially among women…and where
there are anxiety and a lack of clear criteria.”[18]
These sightings produce a form of emotional reward that causes them to be
perpetuated in the community. People desire to be included in the community and
will delude themselves into believing they have seen something in order to gain
approval in the community. Goulder also claims that as the resurrection visions
were recounted over time more and more details were added to “fill in the gaps”
and make the accounts more plausible.
So it becomes
important to stress the reality, the physical nature of the resurrection. This
is done in steps. At first in the 60s we have the empty-tomb story (which
requires burial in a tomb), which we first find in Mark. Then in Luke we have
stories about Jesus’ eating and drinking and asking to be touched. Finally
these physical aspects are made memorable by the stories of Thomas and Mary
Magdalene (“Do not hold on to me”) in John (20:17). Luke wrote in 90 C.E., and
John about 100 C.E.[19]
This
gradual expansion in narrative of the resurrection appearances became a form of
communal delusion, not in the sense of hallucinations, but as a form of
elaborated myth. This delusion had such a strong effect that it completely
altered the personalities of the disciples and early believers.[20]
The
first problem with Goulder’s hypothesis is that much of what proposes is
founded on conjecture. Goulder frequent use of the term “imagined” implicitly
admits that much of what he supposes cannot be proven directly.[21]
In addressing Paul’s vision Goulder begins by stating, “We do not know anything
in detail about [Paul‘s mental state] before his conversion experience.”[22]
However, much of what Goulder has to say about Paul is founded upon Paul’s
pre-conversion life and mental state. Similarly, in discussing the emotional
state of Peter before his conversion experience, Goulder maintains that while
it may be hard to psychoanalyze Peter, “historians (and psychologists) are
trying to…account for events in the light of other similar happenings. It is only too easy to imagine Peter…pacing
up and down in his bedroom.”[23]
Michael Licona notes, “Appealing to possibilities does not warrant the
conclusion that it is what happened.”[24]
However Goulder’s theory, at each step, must build upon what he has stated
previously is only a possibility, not a fact.
This
leads into the second issue with Goulder’s assessment: as previously noted, the
analysis of a subjects mind and emotions is not something that can be done
successfully by imagining someone’s state of mind. Goulder’s usage of Jung’s
psychoanalysis of Paul does not bolster his case, but instead demonstrates that
he is, in fact, guessing at someone’s mental state. In his analysis, Jung
states that his diagnosis of psychogenetic blindness is due to prior experience
in dealing with fanatics.[25]
It must then be asked, if we have no prior record of Paul’s mental state prior
to conversion, as Goulder verifies, by what means does Jung decide that Paul
fits his prior experiences with fanatics? Speculation into someone’s mental
state without direct interaction does not allow for an accurate diagnosis of
their mindset or inclination to hallucinate.
Implicit
within all the arguments for hallucination explaining the resurrection appearances
of Jesus is a naturalistic bias. Goulder sums up this position well when he
states that “We should only consider a supernatural explanation at all when
totally at a loss for a natural one.”[26]
However, critics such as Lüdemann and Goulder place themselves in the position
of defending hypotheses that founder for lack of evidence and plausibility. By
shedding the commitment to naturalism and allowing for the supernatural, we are
able to see there is an eminently more plausible explanation: Jesus physically
rose from the dead. Hallucinations may be the best naturalistic explanation,
but the evidence, rigorously examined, continually points to the physical
presence of Jesus with his disciples as the most probable cause for the
resurrection appearances.
[1] Gerd
Lüdemann What Really Happened to Jesus: A
Historical Approach to the Resurrection, trans. John Bowden (Louisville, KY:
Westminster John Knox Press, 1995), 130.
[4] Gerd
Lüdemann, The Resurrection of Jesus:
History, Experience, Theology, trans. John Bowden (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress
Press 1994), Kindle e-book, 49.
[5] Gustav
Le Bon, Psychologie der Massen
(1911), with an introduction by Peter R. Hofstätter, 1982, quoted in Gerd
Lüdemann, The Resurrection of Jesus:
History, Experience, Theology, trans. John Bowden (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress
Press, 1994), Kindle e-book, 105.
[6] Michael
R. Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, A
New Historiographical Approach (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2010),
505.
[9] Leonard
Zusne and Warren Jones, Anomalistic
Psychology: A Study of Extraordinary Phenomena of Behavior and Experience
(Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1982), 135–36, quoted in Gary Habermas; Explaining Away Jesus’ Resurrection, The
Christian Research Journal, Volume 23, No. 4, 2001, http://www.equip.org/articles/explaining-away-jesus-resurrection-hallucination (accessed March
22, 2012).
[10] Gary
R. Habermas and Michael R. Licona, The
Case for the Resurrection of Jesus, (Grand Rapids, MI, Kregel, 2004),
Kindle e-book, location 972.
[11] Theodor
W. Adorno,”Masses” in Aspects of Sociology. trans. John Viertel.
(Boston, MA, Beacon Press, 1972). pp. 72-88, http://solomon.tinyurl.alexanderstreet.com/cgi-bin/asp/philo/soth/getdoc.pl?S10023167-D000006, (accessed March
27, 2012).
[12] Nicholas
Covington, “Jesus’ Resurrection and Mass Hallucinations”, Digital Bits Skeptic
Blog, entry posted August 16, 2009, http://www.dbskeptic.com/2009/08/16/jesus-resurrection-and-mass-hallucinations/ (accessed March
22, 2012).
[13] N.T.
Wrong (pseud.), “The Resurrection of Jesus as Mass Hallucination”, N.T Wrong
Blog Archive, entry posted September 24, 2008, http://ntwrong.wordpress.com/2008/09/24/resurrection-of-jesus-as-mass-hallucination/ (accessed March
22, 2012).
[14] Michael
Goulder, Jesus’ Resurrection: Fact or Figment?,
eds. Paul Copan and Ronald K.
Tacelli (Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity Press, 2000), Kindle e-book, 95.
[17] Carl Gustav
Jung, Contributions to Analytical
Psychology (ET; New York; Harcourt Brace; London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner,
1928), 257, in Michael Goulder. Jesus’
Resurrection: Fact or Figment? eds. Paul Copan and Ronald K. Tacelli (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press,
2000), Kindle e-book, 94.
[19] Ibid., 99.
[20] Ibid., 95.
[21]Ibid., 92, 99,
100.
[22] Ibid., 91.
[24] Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 483.
Hi, Nicholas Covington here. I think it's great that you have taken the time to read critiques of the resurrection theory, including some of the best, like Ludemann and Goulder. Many people, atheists included, often don't have the bravery to look at other viewpoints with such boldness, or such thoroughness, as you have. Below is my response, I hope to clarify myself on a couple of points.
ReplyDelete"Both arguments by Covington and N.T. Wrong fall into the same problems shared by Lüdemann’s hypothesis – an appeal to conjecture with no solid evidence to substantiate the claim. "
There are two possibilities with respect to the appearance to the five hundred (assuming it is historical):
(A) Everyone present saw the same thing.
(B) They did not.
I agree with you that there is no evidence for (B), but by the same token, there is no evidence for (A) either. We cannot affirm that either of these is true then, since by the evidence we have either could be true. You cannot inisist that (A) is true, and by the same token no skeptic can insist that (B) is true either. The point that I was trying to make in my book was that apologists often embellish the evidence to make hallucination really unlikely when in fact we do not have enough details on this appearances to say such a thing. The concern I have is a valid one, there are multiple group appearances of the Virgin Mary that have not held up when detailed questions were asked of those present: people gave wildly contradictory descriptions of her (which is what we expect if they are lying or hallucinating). The lack of detailed descriptions in our early sources for Christianity, combined with the fact that lots of similar supernatural visions have not had people seeing precisely the same vision mean that we simply take for granted that they did in early Christianity.
"Most modern psychologists spend months or years in personal interviews with their subjects to create the sort of profile that Covington does with much more limited resource."
This criticism, if valid, would also undercut an enormous number of apologetics for the resurrection. For instance, mike Licona has often stated that "Jesus was the last person in the world Paul would have wanted to see." But this presupposes knowledge of Paul's psychological state, which you are saying we cannot do, which would undercut Licona's argument. Further, this argument is also self-refuting, since if I cannot say that the early Christians hallucinated, you cannot say that they did not. Last
Last but not least, hallucinations are known, well documented phenomena whereas resurrections are not. Given this, we should sooner infer hallucination than the miraculous. If a friend of yours told you he was abducted by aliens, you would probably infer hallucination even lacking a psychiatritic diagnosis.
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