There is an underlying assumption in Western culture that
the physical universe is all that there is, and it is bound by strict laws that
cannot be violated. This radical empiricism caused Douglas Adams to write, “My
universe is my eyes and my ears. Anything else is hearsay.”[1] So
it is not surprising that those who believe in miracles are often met with
vehement opposition, especially in relation to the miracles attributed to Jesus
Christ. For if the universe is strictly naturalistic, then there is no place
for divine intervention and no place for God outside of the universe either.
But is it reasonable to reject out of hand the miracles of Christ? I contend
that this blanket rejection of miracles is not based upon a solid,
methodological foundation, but is instead an a priori rejection of the supernatural, and that the miracles of
Christ are eminently reasonable if approached with the desire to be as neutral
in our worldview as possible.
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David Hume (1711-1776) |
It is important to understand where the bias against
miracles in Western thought originates. Therefore, before we look at more
recent arguments against miracles, we must first lay some ground work by
looking at David Hume and his argument against miracles. Hume argues in his
essay “Of Miracles” that the only means by which testimony of a miracle may be
believed is if “its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it
endeavors to establish.”[2]
Hume then assumes that there is no testimony that is sufficiently strong to
disallow the uniformity of human experience in regard to natural laws. It is
his estimation that no individual testimony can be free from the possibility of
“delusion” or “design to deceive others”[3]
because we must always give preference to that which is based “on the greatest
number of past observations.”[4]
Hume also contends that reports of the miraculous are only found among the
barbarous and ignorant who exaggerate the natural because of the “propensity of
mankind toward the marvelous.”[5]
While there are several problems with Hume’s argument,
there are three main areas that are directly pertinent if we want to approach
the miraculous in a neutral manner. First, by Hume’s reasoning much of what we
accept as being true in science and history would have to be discarded because
it would not meet his burden of proof. Michael R. Licona states “Much of what
we hold about the past is reported by a lone source and is rarely ‘beyond all
suspicion’.”[6]
Accordingly, this data cannot be verified by the uniformity of human experience
or freed from the charge of falsehood. Taken to its logical extreme, this would
disallow the testimony of a sole witness and instead demand that all must be
experienced firsthand to be considered true. An individual’s personal
experience cannot be the basis to “exclude the experience to which another
person testifies.”[7]
Second, many critics of Hume point out that his argument falls into the
category of circular reasoning. Hume first assumes that the record of human
experience is uniform and then posits that a testimony that contradicts this
uniformity must be rejected because it goes against the uniformity of human
experience. Craig S. Keener aptly points out that, “[Hume] excludes from being
a miracle anything that can be observed to occur in the ordinary course of
nature, yet he excludes the possibility of anything that does not occur in the ordinary course of
nature.”[8]
Finally, and most pertinent, is that Hume’s argument has
an implicit atheistic or deistic basis that does not allow evidence to ever lead
to the possibility of a miracle. A miracle is best understood as an event that
manifests “divine intervention in human affairs”[9].
Michael Licona narrows the definition of a miracle even more by stating that we
should only expect one in an “environment or context charged with religious significance.”[10]
This eliminates the idea that a miracle can be that which is merely improbable
or unlikely and places it in the realm of the supernatural, being caused by an agent outside of the natural. Hume,
however, defines a miracle as something that must violate the laws of nature[11]
rather than as an event caused from outside of nature. It’s at this point that
Hume’s bias shows through. For if we take his view to its logical conclusion we
are left with a natural realm that is uniform and cannot be violated, and any
causal agent outside of nature must either not exist or be active in the
natural realm.
If we adhere
strictly to Hume’s reasoning, we are left to explain events only by
naturalistic causes and the miraculous, defined as such, is a priori excluded. However,
it must be noted that full theism need not be embraced to allow for the
possibility of miracles. Skeptical and agnostic starting points can also allow
for a neutral evaluation that leads to the possibility of miracles. Keener
notes “one need not presuppose the existence of a deity to allow the hypothesis
of a deity’s action; one need only not rule it out…An atheist has reason to
presuppose miracles impossible on the premise of atheism, but they are not logically
impossible; the degree of possibility assigned to miracles depends on one’s
prior assumptions.”[12]
Philosopher
Antony Flew argues that Hume’s argument can be strengthened if we move away
from the problems of human testimony and instead direct our question to how
miracles would affect our epistemology. He argues that by doing so we can state
confidently that there is no reason to accept the reports of miracles by Christ
or of Christ’s resurrection. Flew posits that historians involved in critical
research must accept certain criteria if they are going to have any faith in
the reliability of historical documents. They must first accept that the
reported events are subject to the same regularities that we see around us
today. For example, to accept Vincenzo Viviani’s report of Galileo’s famous
experiment with gravity at Pisa, we must expect that we could recreate the
event today by ascending the Leaning Tower of Pisa and dropping two objects of
different masses and watching them plummet at the same rate. Second, the
historian must use all of his accumulated knowledge of the possible and
impossible to determine the feasibility of an event in the past. So not only
must we able to, in theory, replicate Galileo’s experiment, but we must also be
able to conclude there is no way in which it is impossible that the experiment
could fail or result in a new outcome.
From these two
foundational ideas Flew concludes that the historian must reject miracles
because “the word miracle has to be
defined in terms of physical necessity and physical impossibility, the
application of these criteria inevitably precludes the proof of the actual
occurrence of a miracle.”[13]
Stated more simply, since a miracle is effectively a onetime event intended to
show the impossible, it must be excluded as a valid occurrence because it
invalidates how we know history. To support this thesis, Flew suggests that the
recounting of a miracle must take the form of “once upon a time, on one
particular occasion, this or that actually happened”[14]
because it is an event that is not able to be confirmed or verified. In
contrast, history reported from a naturalistic point of view can be framed in
reports as something that occurred because prior causality and probability made
it so. There is no allowance for a truly impossible, singular event. In fact,
the “propositions asserting the subsistence of laws of nature and/or of causal
connections, can in principle…be tested and retested anywhere at any time.”[15]
Flew, in effect, demands that miracles be subject to the rigors of
repeatability and falsifiability in modern experimental science.
Flew
anticipates the largest challenge to his position to be the discovery of
naturalistic explanations for miracles in the Bible. However, he considers this
to be a point which would actually increase the strength of his argument.
Finding that a miracle actually has a naturalistic explanation would be “not a
bit of help to the apologist if the progressive verification is
achieved…although what was said to have happened did indeed happen, it
happening was not after all miraculous.”[16]
Flew believes his argument strong enough to claim that if the miracles of Jesus
were to be affirmed in this way, then they could be categorically rejected as
proofs of the deity of Christ.
The problem
with Flew’s argument is not the explanation of miracles by naturalistic means
as he assumes. Rather, Flew’s argument is internally inconsistent because it
subjects historical research to the same methodology as experimental science.
Within scientific research it is expected that phenomena can be repeated
because experiments are designed to be repeated and falsified. However,
historical research does not deal in such concrete terms. There are events
within history that are accepted to be true though they are unique, singular
events that cannot be repeated under observation. To subject these events to
Flew’s criteria would mean rejecting them outright. In a rebuttal to Flew’s
argument, Norman L. Geisler argues that two of the most widely accepted
scientific hypotheses would have to be discarded if Flew is correct: the big
bang and the origin of life on earth. Geisler states “if Flew’s argument
against miracles is correct, then it is a mistake for scientists to believe in
either of these singularities…[their] existence as an unrepeated singularity
refutes Flew’s argument against miracles.”[17]
Similarly,
Flew’s naturalistic position fails to meet the standards to which he subjects
miracles. Flew requires that miracles be able to be repeated under the
standards of science. One of these standards is falsifiability – the logical
possibility that an assertion, hypothesis, or theory “can be contradicted by an
observation or the outcome of a physical experiment”[18]
with the intent that universal laws can be formulated from unique observation
rather than possibly false generalizations. Flew fails to meet this standard
primarily because he disallows any method by which we may know a miracle as a
historical event in contradiction to strictly naturalistic events. Geisler points
out that, “Flew must answer that no event in the world would falsify his
naturalism because in practice he believes the evidence is always greater
against miracles than for them.”[19]
So while Flew criticizes miracles as being unfalsifiable, his own naturalistic
worldview is just as unfalsifiable and subject to the same criticisms he levels
against theists.
Another
criticism leveled against miracles has its roots in Hume’s statement “A wise man, therefore, proportions his
belief to the evidence.”[20]
This phrase was more broadly popularized by Astronomer Carl Sagan in his 1980
TV series The Cosmos as
“Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.”[21]
At its core this statement reflects a healthy skepticism. For most people,
common sense would dictate that if someone claims the outrageous, they had
better be able to support the claim with strong evidence. However, Hume’s
statement has been misapplied to miracles by skeptics to claim that in order to
prove the reality of a miracle one must provide an equivalent amount of
irrefutable evidence.
While this
position may seem reasonable to the skeptic, there are several problems with
it. In claiming extraordinary evidence be presented, the skeptic then must
answer “How much evidence is extraordinary evidence? Is there some objective
standard that must be met?” The truthful skeptic must concede that there is no
objective standard that must be met. The burden of proof to be met is based
solely on the presuppositions and worldview of the person demanding the evidence.
For those assessing miracle claims from either a theistic or agnostic starting
point, the burden of proof will be less because they are open to the
possibility of divine interaction. However, for the atheist or deist, this
burden of proof will be much higher, if not impossible to meet, because their
starting presupposition either denies God’s existence or does not allow God to
interact in the natural world.
Additionally,
the inherent bias in the burden of proof demanded allows skeptics a way to categorically
reject any proof in order to maintain their worldview. Apologist Matt Slick
explains that the demand for extraordinary evidence allows the skeptic to “retain
his presupposition should the extraordinary level of the evidence not be
met. Therefore, requiring extraordinary evidence effectively stacks the
deck against the claim.”[22] These
two factors effectively disallow any reasonable or unbiased evaluation of
evidence for a miracle claim if the skeptic is starting from an atheistic or
deistic position. Michael Licona points out that if we are wanting to evaluate
a claim from a neutral position we should not require extraordinary evidence,
but
“additional
evidence that addresses my present understanding of reality or my
[presuppositions], which may be handicapped and in need of revision…It is the
responsibility of the historian to consider what the evidence would look like
if she were not wearing her metaphysical bias like a pair of sunglasses that
shade the world. It is not the responsibility of the evidence to shine so
brightly that they render such glasses ineffectual.”[23]
Therefore, the solution is not
to provide extraordinary evidence, but instead to show that there is sufficient
evidence. Again, skeptics may argue that providing more evidence does not
fulfill the claim “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.”
However, to disregard this principle is to disregard how our legal system works
in criminal cases. Most cases cannot be prosecuted by extraordinary evidence,
they must be prosecuted by enough
evidence to prove that a defendant is guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The
goal, then, is not extraordinary evidence, but sufficient evidence.
How then are we to react to reports of the miraculous,
especially in regard to the miracles of Christ? In evaluating both Hume and
Flew, we can assert that categorically rejecting miracles based upon either
human testimony or epistemology leads to inconsistencies in reasoning and an
unfair bias to atheistic and deistic ideologies. When confronted with strong
evidence that miracles have occurred, it behooves us to evaluate the data in as
neutral a manner as possible. While this may not be objectively possible due to
our own ingrained presuppositions, we do violence to the evidence if we
categorically reject it based solely upon how we believe the world should work.
Any careful evaluation of the world around us will cause even the skeptic to
realize that our definition of reality cannot be limited to our eyes, ears, and
nothing else.
[1]
Douglas Adams, The Restaurant at the End
of the Universe in The Ultimate
Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy (New York, NY: Del Rey, 2002), 298.
[2]
David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding , http://www.davidhume.org/texts/ehu#SBN109
(accessed Apr. 23, 2012), 10.13.
[3]
Ibid, 10.15
[4]
Ibid, 10.16.
[5]
Ibid, 10.20.
[6]
Michael R. Licona, The Resurrection of
Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic,
2010), 139.
[7]
Craig S. Keener, Miracles: The
Credibility of the New Testament Accounts (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker
Academic, 2011), 148.
[8]
Ibid, 146.
[9] Merriam Webster Dictionary s.v.
“Miracle”, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/miracle
(accessed Apr. 17, 2012).
[10]
Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus,
171.
[11]
Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding, 10.12.
[12]
Keener, Miracles, 138-139.
[13]
Antony Flew, Neo-Humean Arguments Against
the Miraculous in In Defense of
Miracles, R. Douglas Geivett and Gary R. Habermas, eds. (Downers Grove, IL:
Intervarsity Press, 1997), 49.
[14]
Ibid, 50.
[15]
Ibid, 50.
[16]
Flew, In Defense of Miracles, 53.
[17]
Norman L. Geisler, Miracles & the
Modern Mind in In Defense of Miracles,
R. Douglas Geivett and Gary R. Habermas, eds. (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity
Press, 1997), 83.
[18]
Wikipedia s.v. “Falsifiability” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falsifiability
(accessed Apr. 23, 2012).
[19]
Geisler, In Defense of Miracles, 83.
[20]
Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding, 10.4.
[21]
The Cosmos, “Encyclopædia Galactica”,
Episode 12, Youtube.com, 1:26, http://youtu.be/5DgWOlqa-iQ
, (accessed Apr. 23, 2012).
[22]
Matt Slick, Extraordinary Claims Require
Extraordinary Evidence, Christian Apologetics & Research Ministry, http://carm.org/extraordinary-claims-require-extraordinary-evidence
, (accessed Apr. 23, 2012).
[23]
Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus,
195-196.
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