Miracles and Hume's Bias

            There is an underlying assumption in Western culture that the physical universe is all that there is, and it is bound by strict laws that cannot be violated. This radical empiricism caused Douglas Adams to write, “My universe is my eyes and my ears. Anything else is hearsay.”[1] So it is not surprising that those who believe in miracles are often met with vehement opposition, especially in relation to the miracles attributed to Jesus Christ. For if the universe is strictly naturalistic, then there is no place for divine intervention and no place for God outside of the universe either. But is it reasonable to reject out of hand the miracles of Christ? I contend that this blanket rejection of miracles is not based upon a solid, methodological foundation, but is instead an a priori rejection of the supernatural, and that the miracles of Christ are eminently reasonable if approached with the desire to be as neutral in our worldview as possible.

David Hume (1711-1776)

            It is important to understand where the bias against miracles in Western thought originates. Therefore, before we look at more recent arguments against miracles, we must first lay some ground work by looking at David Hume and his argument against miracles. Hume argues in his essay “Of Miracles” that the only means by which testimony of a miracle may be believed is if “its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavors to establish.”[2] Hume then assumes that there is no testimony that is sufficiently strong to disallow the uniformity of human experience in regard to natural laws. It is his estimation that no individual testimony can be free from the possibility of “delusion” or “design to deceive others”[3] because we must always give preference to that which is based “on the greatest number of past observations.”[4] Hume also contends that reports of the miraculous are only found among the barbarous and ignorant who exaggerate the natural because of the “propensity of mankind toward the marvelous.”[5]

            While there are several problems with Hume’s argument, there are three main areas that are directly pertinent if we want to approach the miraculous in a neutral manner. First, by Hume’s reasoning much of what we accept as being true in science and history would have to be discarded because it would not meet his burden of proof. Michael R. Licona states “Much of what we hold about the past is reported by a lone source and is rarely ‘beyond all suspicion’.”[6] Accordingly, this data cannot be verified by the uniformity of human experience or freed from the charge of falsehood. Taken to its logical extreme, this would disallow the testimony of a sole witness and instead demand that all must be experienced firsthand to be considered true. An individual’s personal experience cannot be the basis to “exclude the experience to which another person testifies.”[7] Second, many critics of Hume point out that his argument falls into the category of circular reasoning. Hume first assumes that the record of human experience is uniform and then posits that a testimony that contradicts this uniformity must be rejected because it goes against the uniformity of human experience. Craig S. Keener aptly points out that, “[Hume] excludes from being a miracle anything that can be observed to occur in the ordinary course of nature, yet he excludes the possibility of anything that does not occur in the ordinary course of nature.”[8]

            Finally, and most pertinent, is that Hume’s argument has an implicit atheistic or deistic basis that does not allow evidence to ever lead to the possibility of a miracle. A miracle is best understood as an event that manifests “divine intervention in human affairs”[9]. Michael Licona narrows the definition of a miracle even more by stating that we should only expect one in an “environment or context charged with religious significance.”[10] This eliminates the idea that a miracle can be that which is merely improbable or unlikely and places it in the realm of the supernatural, being caused by an agent outside of the natural. Hume, however, defines a miracle as something that must violate the laws of nature[11] rather than as an event caused from outside of nature. It’s at this point that Hume’s bias shows through. For if we take his view to its logical conclusion we are left with a natural realm that is uniform and cannot be violated, and any causal agent outside of nature must either not exist or be active in the natural realm.

If we adhere strictly to Hume’s reasoning, we are left to explain events only by naturalistic causes and the miraculous, defined as such, is a priori excluded. However, it must be noted that full theism need not be embraced to allow for the possibility of miracles. Skeptical and agnostic starting points can also allow for a neutral evaluation that leads to the possibility of miracles. Keener notes “one need not presuppose the existence of a deity to allow the hypothesis of a deity’s action; one need only not rule it out…An atheist has reason to presuppose miracles impossible on the premise of atheism, but they are not logically impossible; the degree of possibility assigned to miracles depends on one’s prior assumptions.”[12]

Philosopher Antony Flew argues that Hume’s argument can be strengthened if we move away from the problems of human testimony and instead direct our question to how miracles would affect our epistemology. He argues that by doing so we can state confidently that there is no reason to accept the reports of miracles by Christ or of Christ’s resurrection. Flew posits that historians involved in critical research must accept certain criteria if they are going to have any faith in the reliability of historical documents. They must first accept that the reported events are subject to the same regularities that we see around us today. For example, to accept Vincenzo Viviani’s report of Galileo’s famous experiment with gravity at Pisa, we must expect that we could recreate the event today by ascending the Leaning Tower of Pisa and dropping two objects of different masses and watching them plummet at the same rate. Second, the historian must use all of his accumulated knowledge of the possible and impossible to determine the feasibility of an event in the past. So not only must we able to, in theory, replicate Galileo’s experiment, but we must also be able to conclude there is no way in which it is impossible that the experiment could fail or result in a new outcome.

From these two foundational ideas Flew concludes that the historian must reject miracles because “the word miracle has to be defined in terms of physical necessity and physical impossibility, the application of these criteria inevitably precludes the proof of the actual occurrence of a miracle.”[13] Stated more simply, since a miracle is effectively a onetime event intended to show the impossible, it must be excluded as a valid occurrence because it invalidates how we know history. To support this thesis, Flew suggests that the recounting of a miracle must take the form of “once upon a time, on one particular occasion, this or that actually happened”[14] because it is an event that is not able to be confirmed or verified. In contrast, history reported from a naturalistic point of view can be framed in reports as something that occurred because prior causality and probability made it so. There is no allowance for a truly impossible, singular event. In fact, the “propositions asserting the subsistence of laws of nature and/or of causal connections, can in principle…be tested and retested anywhere at any time.”[15] Flew, in effect, demands that miracles be subject to the rigors of repeatability and falsifiability in modern experimental science.

Flew anticipates the largest challenge to his position to be the discovery of naturalistic explanations for miracles in the Bible. However, he considers this to be a point which would actually increase the strength of his argument. Finding that a miracle actually has a naturalistic explanation would be “not a bit of help to the apologist if the progressive verification is achieved…although what was said to have happened did indeed happen, it happening was not after all miraculous.”[16] Flew believes his argument strong enough to claim that if the miracles of Jesus were to be affirmed in this way, then they could be categorically rejected as proofs of the deity of Christ.

The problem with Flew’s argument is not the explanation of miracles by naturalistic means as he assumes. Rather, Flew’s argument is internally inconsistent because it subjects historical research to the same methodology as experimental science. Within scientific research it is expected that phenomena can be repeated because experiments are designed to be repeated and falsified. However, historical research does not deal in such concrete terms. There are events within history that are accepted to be true though they are unique, singular events that cannot be repeated under observation. To subject these events to Flew’s criteria would mean rejecting them outright. In a rebuttal to Flew’s argument, Norman L. Geisler argues that two of the most widely accepted scientific hypotheses would have to be discarded if Flew is correct: the big bang and the origin of life on earth. Geisler states “if Flew’s argument against miracles is correct, then it is a mistake for scientists to believe in either of these singularities…[their] existence as an unrepeated singularity refutes Flew’s argument against miracles.”[17]

Similarly, Flew’s naturalistic position fails to meet the standards to which he subjects miracles. Flew requires that miracles be able to be repeated under the standards of science. One of these standards is falsifiability – the logical possibility that an assertion, hypothesis, or theory “can be contradicted by an observation or the outcome of a physical experiment”[18] with the intent that universal laws can be formulated from unique observation rather than possibly false generalizations. Flew fails to meet this standard primarily because he disallows any method by which we may know a miracle as a historical event in contradiction to strictly naturalistic events. Geisler points out that, “Flew must answer that no event in the world would falsify his naturalism because in practice he believes the evidence is always greater against miracles than for them.”[19] So while Flew criticizes miracles as being unfalsifiable, his own naturalistic worldview is just as unfalsifiable and subject to the same criticisms he levels against theists.

Another criticism leveled against miracles has its roots in Hume’s statement  “A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence.”[20] This phrase was more broadly popularized by Astronomer Carl Sagan in his 1980 TV series The Cosmos as “Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.”[21] At its core this statement reflects a healthy skepticism. For most people, common sense would dictate that if someone claims the outrageous, they had better be able to support the claim with strong evidence. However, Hume’s statement has been misapplied to miracles by skeptics to claim that in order to prove the reality of a miracle one must provide an equivalent amount of irrefutable evidence.

While this position may seem reasonable to the skeptic, there are several problems with it. In claiming extraordinary evidence be presented, the skeptic then must answer “How much evidence is extraordinary evidence? Is there some objective standard that must be met?” The truthful skeptic must concede that there is no objective standard that must be met. The burden of proof to be met is based solely on the presuppositions and worldview of the person demanding the evidence. For those assessing miracle claims from either a theistic or agnostic starting point, the burden of proof will be less because they are open to the possibility of divine interaction. However, for the atheist or deist, this burden of proof will be much higher, if not impossible to meet, because their starting presupposition either denies God’s existence or does not allow God to interact in the natural world.

Additionally, the inherent bias in the burden of proof demanded allows skeptics a way to categorically reject any proof in order to maintain their worldview. Apologist Matt Slick explains that the demand for extraordinary evidence allows the skeptic to “retain his presupposition should the extraordinary level of the evidence not be met.  Therefore, requiring extraordinary evidence effectively stacks the deck against the claim.”[22] These two factors effectively disallow any reasonable or unbiased evaluation of evidence for a miracle claim if the skeptic is starting from an atheistic or deistic position. Michael Licona points out that if we are wanting to evaluate a claim from a neutral position we should not require extraordinary evidence, but

“additional evidence that addresses my present understanding of reality or my [presuppositions], which may be handicapped and in need of revision…It is the responsibility of the historian to consider what the evidence would look like if she were not wearing her metaphysical bias like a pair of sunglasses that shade the world. It is not the responsibility of the evidence to shine so brightly that they render such glasses ineffectual.”[23]

Therefore, the solution is not to provide extraordinary evidence, but instead to show that there is sufficient evidence. Again, skeptics may argue that providing more evidence does not fulfill the claim “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.” However, to disregard this principle is to disregard how our legal system works in criminal cases. Most cases cannot be prosecuted by extraordinary evidence, they must be prosecuted by enough evidence to prove that a defendant is guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The goal, then, is not extraordinary evidence, but sufficient evidence.

            How then are we to react to reports of the miraculous, especially in regard to the miracles of Christ? In evaluating both Hume and Flew, we can assert that categorically rejecting miracles based upon either human testimony or epistemology leads to inconsistencies in reasoning and an unfair bias to atheistic and deistic ideologies. When confronted with strong evidence that miracles have occurred, it behooves us to evaluate the data in as neutral a manner as possible. While this may not be objectively possible due to our own ingrained presuppositions, we do violence to the evidence if we categorically reject it based solely upon how we believe the world should work. Any careful evaluation of the world around us will cause even the skeptic to realize that our definition of reality cannot be limited to our eyes, ears, and nothing else.

---

[1] Douglas Adams, The Restaurant at the End of the Universe in The Ultimate Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy (New York, NY: Del Rey, 2002), 298.

[2] David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding , http://www.davidhume.org/texts/ehu#SBN109 (accessed Apr. 23, 2012), 10.13.

[3] Ibid, 10.15

[4] Ibid, 10.16.

[5] Ibid, 10.20.

[6] Michael R. Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2010), 139.

[7] Craig S. Keener, Miracles: The Credibility of the New Testament Accounts (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2011), 148.

[8] Ibid, 146.

[9] Merriam Webster Dictionary s.v. “Miracle”, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/miracle (accessed Apr. 17, 2012).

[10] Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 171.

[11] Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 10.12.

[12] Keener, Miracles, 138-139.

[13] Antony Flew, Neo-Humean Arguments Against the Miraculous in In Defense of Miracles, R. Douglas Geivett and Gary R. Habermas, eds. (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1997), 49.

[14] Ibid, 50.

[15] Ibid, 50.

[16] Flew, In Defense of Miracles, 53.

[17] Norman L. Geisler, Miracles & the Modern Mind in In Defense of Miracles, R. Douglas Geivett and Gary R. Habermas, eds. (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 1997), 83.

[18] Wikipedia s.v. “Falsifiability” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Falsifiability (accessed Apr. 23, 2012).

[19] Geisler, In Defense of Miracles, 83.

[20] Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 10.4.

[21] The Cosmos, “Encyclopædia Galactica”, Episode 12, Youtube.com, 1:26, http://youtu.be/5DgWOlqa-iQ , (accessed Apr. 23, 2012).

[22] Matt Slick, Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence, Christian Apologetics & Research Ministry, http://carm.org/extraordinary-claims-require-extraordinary-evidence , (accessed Apr. 23, 2012).

[23] Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 195-196.